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MEMORANDUM: OR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Procedures for Validation of Evaluations of

Clandestine Services Reporting

REFERENCE

: Your memorandum of 24 January 1968, same

subject

- 1. I have considered your memorandum carefully. I share, of course, your desire to ensure that all evaluations, including those rendered orally, are valid. The question is one of means.
- 2. Before discussing alternative proposals, I should like to list what seem to me the essential criteria for any procedure.
 - a. It should produce valid evaluations.
 - b. When necessary, it should produce speedy evaluations.
 - c. When necessary, it should produce detailed and thorough evaluations.
 - d. It should be simple, understandable, and as little of a burden on anybody as possible.
 - e. It should allocate responsibility appropriately.
- 3. Since you indicate that you are speaking for the Directorate of Science and Technology as well as the Directorate of Intelligence, I shall refer to them together for convenience as the intelligence Directorates.
- 4. At present, most Clandestine Services requests for evaluations by the intelligence Directorates, including a substantial proportion of requests in support of the assessments program of the FI Staff, are made in writing through the Information Requirements Staff, and the resultant evaluations are received through the same channel, having presumably been validated in accordance with your procedures. The question you raise concerns only those evaluations which are obtained by the FI Staff through the second method of interviewing analysts.

- 5. The problem as you state it is that the present arrangement "relies only on analysts' views and does not provide for the balanced and authoritative validation that we are now demanding for other collection guidance and requirements for collection by human sources."
- 6. It is necessary to understand the purpose and methods of the FI assessments program. It is not designed as a requirements or collection guidance program. Its purpose is not to obtain new requirements but to evaluate reporting against previously authorized requirements. It is concerned with the information product of stations, operations, and sources. Specific reports are what is discussed with analysts. It is true that analysts sometimes volunteer their views on requirements matters. I shall return to this point later.
- 7. Most FI assessments deal with individual sources or projects. A smaller number deal with broad subjects such as the production of an entire station, but almost invariably this also involves specific treatment of projects and sources. Evaluations from consumer offices—including DIA and State/INR as well as CIA consumers—are only one form of input to these studies. These evaluations of reports are one basis for the final FI evaluation of source production.
- 8. As I have said, some evaluations of groups of reports needed for FI assessments are obtained in writing through formal channels. But in many cases interviews are vastly preferable, for one or both of the following reasons:
 - a. The need for speed (almost always present when the occasion is a project renewal action)
 - b. The fact that when there are many reports, a number of sources, or various facets of reporting to be covered, an interview accomplishes far more in far less time than any other method. The analyst is seeing the reports for the second time (having read them when they were published). He can quickly refresh his memory of them, and by mutual questioning the points at issue can be isolated and treated. To attempt the same thing in writing would be burdensome to the analyst, involve mountains of paper, and result in much less responsive evaluations.
- 9. To return now to the problem you have raised, I should like to comment briefly on the two alternative solutions you have described and to offer two more for your consideration.

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- 10. I agree with you that your first alternative—to "require the FI Staff to request the Information Requirements Staff to obtain such validated assessments through the chain of command of the substantive offices involved"—should be avoided if at all possible. My principal reasons appear in the foregoing paragraph. In effect, this procedure would mean that the Clandestine Services would lack the benefit of timely and appropriate DDI/DDS&T evaluations of much of our production, and would have to rely exclusively on the remaining available inputs to our assessments program.
- described in your paragraph 4, I regret that it seems to me to ignore key aspects of the problem, possibly because the Clandestine Services' problem had not been made perfectly clear to you. Briefly, this procedure would require FI Staff to interview the analyst, write down the analyst's views, and forward these views to the Information Requirements Staff, which would obtain validation from the "appropriate authorities," who, I think it is fair to say, would in many cases be the first- and second-echelon supervisors of the original analyst. Finally, the Information Requirements Staff would transmit the validated paper to the FI Staff.
 - a. My principal objection to this procedure is that it interposes the FI Staff between the DDI or DDS&T analyst and his superiors in the production offices, as well as between the production offices and the Information Requirements Staff. This is not, in my judgment, a proper function for the FI Staff. It should not be necessary for the FI Staff to enter the intelligence Directorates at two different times and two different points in order to obtain one evaluation.
 - b. Your paragraph 4. b is based on the assumption that the FI Staff drafts its assessment studies in such form that a section of the draft could appropriately be circulated for DDI/DDS&T review. For various reasons related to the purpose and organization of the studies this is seldom the case, and your proposal would thus necessitate the creation of a separate document solely for validation purposes. This would be time-consuming.
 - c. Inherent in your proposal is the assumption that no use would be made of the analyst's evaluation until it had been validated. Any contrary course would negate the purpose of validation. But to wait for the validated version would in many cases be to miss the boat on, for instance, a project renewal.

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- d. In view of the nature of the oral evaluations received, it is hard to see how they could be meaningfully validated except by someone who went over the same 25 or 75 reports read by the analyst. I doubt that you had such a chore in mind for your validating officers. In any event I would not wish reports grouped by source to go through the mails.
- e. In short, referring to the criteria in my second paragraph, this method might produce valid evaluations, but often too late for use. It is not simple; it imposes an extra workload on both sides of the house; and it does not allocate responsibility appropriately.
- 12. I should like to suggest two other alternatives for your consideration. Both are designed to meet your problem as well as mine.
 - a. The first is to have the validating authority sit with the analyst and the FI interviewer, and validate the evaluations on the spot. In most cases this would be the analyst's division chief or other supervisor. (Indeed, the "analyst" interviewed by the FI Staff sometimes is a division chief.) There are not an enormous number of interviews—there were 45 in the last half of 1967—and they do not fall heavily on any one area. I am convinced that the occasional hour or two spent in this way by one of your ranking officers would be no burden at all, compared with the man hours, paperwork, and total elapsed time under the procedure previously discussed. Furthermore, these senior officers will be in a position to report to you the exact nature and thrust of these meetings. I would certainly have no objection if it were desired to have a representative of the Information Requirements Staff sit in as well.
 - b. A final alternative, which I would consider acceptable though less desirable than the preceding one, would be based on an agreed distinction between (1) evaluation of reporting against existing requirements, and (2) collection guidance, requirements, "gaps," or any other statements by analysts which might be intended or understood to bear on what the Clandestine Services try to collect, or how the collection effort should be apportioned. Evaluations of reporting would be used by the FI Staff without further validation. The second category would not be used without first confirming through the Information Requirements Staff that it did constitute validated guidance. This, I think, would achieve the purpose of validation without bogging down the evaluation program.

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13. I suggest that you establish the validation procedure outlined in paragraph 12. a--on a trial basis, if you prefer. If this procedure is not acceptable to you, I suggest the alternative outlined in paragraph 12. b.

Is Thomas H. Karamessikes

Thomas H. Karamessines Deputy Director for Plans

cc: DDCI
DDS&T